A parabolic approach to the control of opinion spreading

We analyze the problem of controlling to consensus a nonlinear system modeling opinion spreading. We derive explicit exponential estimates on the cost of approximately controlling these systems to consensus, as a function of the number of agents N and the control time-horizon T. Our strategy makes use of known results on the controllability of spatially discretized semilinear parabolic equations. Both systems can be linked through time-rescalin

Making use of fuzzy cognitive maps in agent-based modeling

One of the main challenges in Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is to model agents’ preferences and behavioral rules such that the knowledge and decision-making processes of real-life stakeholders will be reflected. To tackle this challenge, we demonstrate the potential use of a participatory method, Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM), that aggregates agents’ qualitative knowledge (i.e., knowledge co-production). In our proposed approach, the outcome of FCM would be a basis for designing agents’ preferences and behavioral rules in ABM. We apply this method to a social-ecological system of a farming community facing water scarcity

Learning and innovative elements of strategy adoption rules expand cooperative network topologies

Cooperation plays a key role in the evolution of complex systems. However, the level of cooperation extensively varies with the topology of agent networks in the widely used models of repeated games. Here we show that cooperation remains rather stable by applying the reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-learning on a variety of random, regular, small-word, scale-free and modular network models in repeated, multi-agent Prisoners Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games. Furthermore, we found that using the above model systems other long-term learning strategy adoption rules also promote cooperation, while introducing a low level of noise (as a model of innovation) to the strategy adoption rules makes the level of cooperation less dependent on the actual network topology. Our results demonstrate that long-term learning and random elements in the strategy adoption rules, when acting together, extend the range of network topologies enabling the development of cooperation at a wider range of costs and temptations. These results suggest that a balanced duo of learning and innovation may help to preserve cooperation during the re-organization of real-world networks, and may play a prominent role in the evolution of self-organizing, complex systems.Comment: 14 pages, 3 Figures + a Supplementary Material with 25 pages, 3 Tables, 12 Figures and 116 reference

Agent model for evaluating efficiency of regional human resource

In this paper we study influence of regional programs on the population resettlement in the Russian Federation at the example of the Belgorod region, where the Program of regional human resource development is being implemente

Complexity, Development, and Evolution in Morphogenetic Collective Systems

Many living and non-living complex systems can be modeled and understood as collective systems made of heterogeneous components that self-organize and generate nontrivial morphological structures and behaviors. This chapter presents a brief overview of our recent effort that investigated various aspects of such morphogenetic collective systems. We first propose a theoretical classification scheme that distinguishes four complexity levels of morphogenetic collective systems based on the nature of their components and interactions. We conducted a series of computational experiments using a self-propelled particle swarm model to investigate the effects of (1) heterogeneity of components, (2) differentiation/re-differentiation of components, and (3) local information sharing among components, on the self-organization of a collective system. Results showed that (a) heterogeneity of components had a strong impact on the system's structure and behavior, (b) dynamic differentiation/re-differentiation of components and local information sharing helped the system maintain spatially adjacent, coherent organization, (c) dynamic differentiation/re-differentiation contributed to the development of more diverse structures and behaviors, and (d) stochastic re-differentiation of components naturally realized a self-repair capability of self-organizing morphologies. We also explored evolutionary methods to design novel self-organizing patterns, using interactive evolutionary computation and spontaneous evolution within an artificial ecosystem. These self-organizing patterns were found to be remarkably robust against dimensional changes from 2D to 3D, although evolution worked efficiently only in 2D settings.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figures, 1 table; submitted to "Evolution, Development, and Complexity: Multiscale Models in Complex Adaptive Systems" (Springer Proceedings in Complexity Series

The Dynamics of Protest Recruitment through an Online Network

The recent wave of mobilizations in the Arab world and across Western countries has generated much discussion on how digital media is connected to the diffusion of protests. We examine that connection using data from the surge of mobilizations that took place in Spain in May 2011. We study recruitment patterns in the Twitter network and find evidence of social influence and complex contagion. We identify the network position of early participants (i.e. the leaders of the recruitment process) and of the users who acted as seeds of message cascades (i.e. the spreaders of information). We find that early participants cannot be characterized by a typical topological position but spreaders tend to be more central in the network. These findings shed light on the connection between online networks, social contagion, and collective dynamics, and offer an empirical test to the recruitment mechanisms theorized in formal models of collective action

Individualization as driving force of clustering phenomena in humans

One of the most intriguing dynamics in biological systems is the emergence of clustering, the self-organization into separated agglomerations of individuals. Several theories have been developed to explain clustering in, for instance, multi-cellular organisms, ant colonies, bee hives, flocks of birds, schools of fish, and animal herds. A persistent puzzle, however, is clustering of opinions in human populations. The puzzle is particularly pressing if opinions vary continuously, such as the degree to which citizens are in favor of or against a vaccination program. Existing opinion formation models suggest that "monoculture" is unavoidable in the long run, unless subsets of the population are perfectly separated from each other. Yet, social diversity is a robust empirical phenomenon, although perfect separation is hardly possible in an increasingly connected world. Considering randomness did not overcome the theoretical shortcomings so far. Small perturbations of individual opinions trigger social influence cascades that inevitably lead to monoculture, while larger noise disrupts opinion clusters and results in rampant individualism without any social structure. Our solution of the puzzle builds on recent empirical research, combining the integrative tendencies of social influence with the disintegrative effects of individualization. A key element of the new computational model is an adaptive kind of noise. We conduct simulation experiments to demonstrate that with this kind of noise, a third phase besides individualism and monoculture becomes possible, characterized by the formation of metastable clusters with diversity between and consensus within clusters. When clusters are small, individualization tendencies are too weak to prohibit a fusion of clusters. When clusters grow too large, however, individualization increases in strength, which promotes their splitting.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

The emergence of altruism as a social norm

Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even when they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectation after playing a DG by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many strategic interactions